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Abstract 
People often have generalised expectations of trustworthiness about ingroup and outgroup 
members, based on previous direct and indirect experience with these groups. How do these 
prior biases interact with new experiences when learning about individual group members’ 
trustworthiness? These three studies are the first to examine the effect of group-level biases 
on learning about individuals’ trustworthiness. Participants from the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom played iterated Trust Games with trustworthy and untrustworthy members 
of both ingroups and outgroups. We show that the influence of group membership on trust 
decisions depended on the valence of the interactions with individual group members. When 
interacting with trustworthy partners, people displayed outgroup favouritism throughout the 
game, investing higher in outgroup members than ingroup members. However, for 
untrustworthy partners, initial outgroup favouritism disappeared, and ingroup and outgroup 
members were equally distrusted by the end of the game. Our work suggests that when 
individual experience is integrated with group-based biases, group membership influences 
trust decisions over time, but mostly when experiences are positive. These findings are 
discussed in relation to complexity-extremity theory and previous work on learning in the 
Trust Game. 
  
Keywords: INTERGROUP BIAS, TRUST, INGROUP FAVORITISM, LEARNING, 
TRUST GAME 
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Group-based Biases Influence Learning about Individual Trustworthiness 
Imagine you are at a bar and see one person wearing a New England Patriots jersey, 
another sporting a Republican Party badge, and a third with a German accent talking to their 
friend. What would you infer about their personality and their attitudes? Which of these 
people would you choose to ask for a favour or trust to look after your bag? We quickly 
categorize others in terms of their group membership (Bargh, 1999; Willis & Todorov, 2006) 
and the social categories to which others belong are vitally important cues for making 
decisions about how we then act towards them (Balliet, Wu, & De Dreu, 2014). In three 
studies, we investigate how social category biases interact with individual experiences in 
forming decisions to trust. 
     Feelings of trust are essential for successful cooperation, particularly when the 
other person is relatively unknown to you, and you cannot therefore rely on previous 
experiences with the person (Balliet & Van Lange, 2013). In this situation, feelings of trust 
come from external cues such as a person’s physical features (e.g. Chang, Doll, van ’t Wout, 
Frank, & Sanfey, 2010; Todorov, Pakrashi, & Oosterhof, 2009) and particularly their group 
membership (Williams, 2001). Generally, people exhibit more trust, cooperation and positive 
reciprocation towards ingroup members than outgroup members (Balliet et al., 2014). This 
so-called ingroup bias for trust has been extensively observed using well-validated economic 
games, such as the Trust Game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995). In this game, a trustor is 
given an endowment that he/she can invest in a trustee. If the trustor invests his/her 
endowment, the amount is multiplied and given to the trustee. The trustee then has the choice 
to reciprocate trust by returning some of the received amount to the trustor, but he/she does 
not have to. Both players can end the game with more money than they started out with, but 
only if they both cooperate. Ingroup favouritism in these cooperative settings has been found 
with many types of naturally occurring groups, such as race (e.g. Burns, 2006), nationality 
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(e.g. Stoddard & Leibbrandt, 2014), or religion (e.g. Rotella, Richeson, Chiao, & Bean, 2013) 
as well as in a minimal-group setting (e.g. Buchan, Johnson, & Croson, 2006). 
  However, people do not always prefer the ingroup or individual ingroup members. A 
considerable amount of research shows that outgroup preferences can exist when that group 
is perceived as high status (Jost, Pelham, & Carvallo, 2002; Trifiletti & Capozza, 2011), or 
high in warmth and competence (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008). Even ethnic majorities can 
occasionally show outgroup preferences towards minority groups (Jussim, Coleman, & 
Lerch, 1987). One theory that accounts for how individual ingroup members can be viewed 
less favourably than outgroup members, particularly once some learning occurs, is the Black 
Sheep Effect (BSE; Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988). In the BSE, people punish deviating 
ingroup members more strongly than deviating outgroup members. This has the purpose of 
maintaining a positive image of the ingroup, which is vital for maintaining a positive social 
identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The BSE predicts that extreme ingroup devaluations occur 
when the deviating member is relevant to one’s social identity, and identification with the 
ingroup is strong. 
Another theory that highlights differences between how ingroup and outgroup 
members are represented is Complexity-Extremity Theory (CET; Linville, 1982). CET 
accounts for situations in which ingroup members (or the ingroup as a whole) can be rated as 
less favourable than outgroup members, and describes situations in which negativity towards 
outgroups may be exacerbated. According to Linville, people’s representations of outgroups 
are less complex than for ingroups, which leads to more extreme evaluations of outgroup 
members than ingroup members for both positive and negative information. Therefore, each 
piece of information about an outgroup member changes the evaluation more than when 
similar information is provided about an ingroup member. This can therefore lead to outgroup 
favouritism (Jussim et al., 1987). 
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  Thus, these two theories both provide cases where the ingroup would not be favoured 
over the outgroup, but different patterns are predicted. According to BSE, ingroup members 
are generally favoured over the outgroup in positive situations, but more strongly devalued 
when behaving negatively. Complexity-extremity theory, however, would predict that the 
outgroup is evaluated more extremely positive than the ingroup when both are presented in a 
positive situation, but more extremely negative when negative information about these groups 
is learned. 
Updating Trustworthiness Impressions      
         Previous studies have focused on initial trust reactions towards ingroup or outgroup 
members. These studies employed one-shot Trust Games whereby players interact only a 
single time with another person. However, this is not analogous to real-world settings, which 
require interaction over some course of time. We are interested in how group biases influence 
judgments about individuals’ trustworthiness when experience becomes available. Group 
membership is a useful piece of information when having to decide on an initial response. 
Once you gain experience with an individual, group-based expectations should be integrated 
with the information you have learned. The aim of the current paper is to examine whether, 
and how, group information influences decisions to trust in these iterated settings, when 
people have to integrate experience with initial group-based biases.      
         The influence of group-level biases on learning about individuals’ trustworthiness has 
not been examined before. However, studies utilising an iterated Trust Game show that 
people are able to learn about the behaviour of individual partners over multiple interactions, 
and adjust their trust decisions accordingly (Chang et al., 2010; Delgado, Frank, & Phelps, 
2005; Fareri, Chang, & Delgado, 2012; Fouragnan et al., 2013). In these studies, information 
about characteristics related to the partner’s trustworthiness, as well as the amounts that the 
partner returned (reciprocity behaviour), were manipulated. Chang and colleagues (2010) 
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found initial beliefs based on facial trustworthiness of the partner influenced initial trust 
decisions, and remained important throughout the entire game. In the last round of the 
iterated game, participants invested more in the trustworthy appearing partners that acted 
trustworthy than in the untrustworthy appearing partners that showed similar trustworthy 
behaviour. However, investments were lower for the trustworthy-appearing partners that did 
not reciprocate trust than for untrustworthy appearing partners that did not reciprocate. In the 
current study, we examine the influence of group-based biases on investment decisions, 
instead of the individual-based biases of facial trustworthiness. 
Overview of Studies and Hypotheses         
         The present research consists of three studies in two different European countries, 
with group membership manipulated through nationality. We adopted an iterated Trust Game 
paradigm, where participants played multiple rounds with several purported individuals from 
the ingroup and outgroup. Trustworthiness of behaviour was manipulated by pre-
programming the return behaviour of the partner to be high or low. Study 1 and 2 explored 
ingroup and outgroup trust in the iterated Trust Game in two different European countries, 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The outgroup consisted of people from different 
European foreign nationalities. Study 3 dived deeper into the underlying processes and 
examined how perceptions of trustworthiness, expectations of return, and affective feelings 
towards the partners are related to changes in investments over time. Moreover, in Study 3 
the outgroup was restricted to one outgroup nationality to control for possible stereotype 
perceptions of the different countries.  
  We predicted that, based on the research described above, players should learn to 
distinguish between trustworthy and untrustworthy partners based on the game experiences 
over trials. Secondly, based on the literature on ingroup favouritism in cooperation (Balliet et 
al., 2014), and Chang and colleagues work, we hypothesised that, should initial ingroup 
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favouritism occur, trustworthy ingroup members would receive higher investments than 
trustworthy outgroup members across repeated interactions.     
         Thirdly, and most interestingly, both the BSE and Chang et al.’s (2010) study would 
predict that responses to untrustworthy ingroup members should be more negative than 
responses to untrustworthy outgroup members, as untrustworthy ingroup members defy the 
positive image and expectations of the ingroup, but this does not apply to the outgroup. 
However, complexity-extremity theory predicts that responses to outgroup members are more 
extreme for both positive and negative reciprocity, due to a low complexity of the group 
representation. From this theory, we would expect investments in trustworthy outgroup 
members to be higher than for trustworthy ingroup members, and investments in 
untrustworthy outgroup members to be lower than for untrustworthy ingroup members. 
 
Study 1 
         Our first experiment was conducted in the Netherlands, with Dutch participants 
playing repeated Trust Games with (pre-programmed response) partners who were 
supposedly Dutch (ingroup) or from another Western European country (outgroup). In 
addition to the Trust Game, we measured expectations that participants had about these 
partners before playing the game, and the certainty of those expectations. Partners were also 
rated individually on trustworthiness, likeability and generosity after the game. Ingroup 
(Dutch) identification was additionally measured. 
         In accordance with past research (Ashraf, Bohnet, & Piankov, 2006; Buchan & 
Croson, 2004), we predicted that expectations would be related to any biases found in 
investment behaviour. Based on the results of Chang et al. (2010), partner ratings following 
the game were expected to reflect both learning from the game, with higher ratings for 
trustworthy than untrustworthy partners, and congruency with any initial group-level biases. 
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Ingroup identification may be related to ingroup bias (Kenworthy & Jones, 2009; Voci, 
2006), with people that identify stronger with the ingroup showing more differentiation 
between ingroup and outgroup investments than people that identify to a lesser extent. 
 
Methods 
Participants and design. Participants (N = 40 students1) were recruited partly via an 
online database and through verbal recruitment. Four participants were removed from 
analyses due to double or different nationalities. The remaining 36 participants (75% female; 
Mage = 24.1 years, SDage = 7.8 years) were Dutch. Participants received either a standard 
payment of €10 or course credit for their time. Ten participants were selected at random to 
receive a bonus monetary amount, which consisted of their average earnings in the game, 
converted to euros (one token = 40 euro cent).  
  A 2 (group: ingroup vs outgroup) x 2 (reciprocity behaviour: low vs high) within 
subject design was employed, with trial number (1 to 15) as continuous predictor. The main 
dependent variable was the investment transferred to the partner, which could range from 
zero to ten tokens. In addition to the Trust Game data, expectations of return and partner 
ratings were examined as dependent variables. 
Materials and procedure. The experiment consisted of three parts, was performed on 
a computer and run on the software programme PsychoPy (Peirce, 2007). Initially, 
participants completed demographic questions and were presented with their eight game 
                                               
1 Sample size was guided by a power analysis performed in GPower 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & 
Buchner, 2007) for a repeated measures F test. The power analysis was based on a medium effect size 
f of .15, a power of .80, 4 groups (Group x Reciprocity), and 15 measurements (individual trial 
number), producing a required sample size of 32. 
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partners. Participants were informed that these partners had played the game previously, and 
that their answers had been saved and would be matched with the investments that the 
participant made in the game. In reality, all the partner behaviours in the game were pre-
programmed, and all information provided about these partners was predetermined. To 
introduce all game partners, participants were presented with a card with information for each 
partner. On this card, information about the nationality, age, gender, and academic major of 
the partner was presented (all predetermined). This information was provided to heighten the 
(false) sense of the partners being real people, as people can behave differently when they 
believe they are playing with a computer versus with a person (Chang et al., 2010). This 
information was only shown before the game began. Additionally, a figure was shown with 
the colours of the flag of the country, and the initials and age of the partner (see Figure 1), 
which would represent the partner throughout the Trust Game. Four of these partners were 
Dutch (ingroup), and four were foreigners (outgroup), consisting of two Germans, one Italian, 
and one French partner. The group membership manipulation was implemented through the 
coloured figures that were presented to the participant throughout the game.   
 
Figure 1. Examples of figures used to indicate the partners. The figure on the left portrays 
and 20-year-old ingroup member, D.V. The figure on the right, figure O.B. is a 26-year-old 
German outgroup member.  
         Repeated Trust Game. Following this, the Trust Game was played. After six practice 
trials, participants played 15 rounds of the repeated Trust Game with each of the eight 
individual partners, thereby playing 120 rounds in total (see Figure 2). The order of the 120 
rounds was fully randomised for each participant. In each round, participants played only the 
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role of trustor, where they decided how many of their 10 tokens to invest in the current 
partner. At the start of each round, participants were shown their current partner for three 
seconds (see Figure 1), then they were prompted to decide how many of the ten tokens to 
invest in that partner. The image of the partner remained on the screen throughout the trial. 
Any investment was tripled by the experimenter and sent to the partner; this multiplied 
amount was presented on the screen for three seconds. Last, participants were shown how 
many tokens the partner had transferred back to the participant on that round. This 
reciprocation rate was predetermined such that half of the partners always transferred a high 
amount in each round (45% to 70% of the received amount on each trial), and half of the 
partners always transferred a low amount (0% to 35% of the received amount). See Figure 2 
for a visual representation of this procedure.  
 
Figure 2. Visual representation of the design of the Trust Game and example of one round of 
the Trust Game. From the pool of eight partners (four ingroup, four outgroup, four high 
trustworthy, four low trustworthy), one partner is selected per round of the Trust Game.         
         Before starting with the game, but after receiving instructions, participants indicated 
their expectations of how much they thought each of the partners would return, as indicated 
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by percentages of the amount they would receive, on a scale ranging from 0% to 100%. Next, 
they were asked for their confidence in this expectation, also on a scale from 0% to 100%.   
         Following the Trust Game, participants rated each of the eight partners on generosity 
displayed during the game as well as general characteristic of kindness and trustworthiness, 
on a scale from zero to 100. This created a reliable index of partner ratings (α = .97). Finally, 
participants completed a 14 item ingroup identification questionnaire (Leach et al., 2008). 
Higher numbers indicate stronger identification with Dutch people (α = 0.89). This procedure 
was approved by a research committee before data collection commenced. 
         Data analysis. Data were analysed using linear multilevel models (also called mixed-
effects models, e.g. Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008), whereby per-subject random 
intercepts were added to incorporate the within-subject design. Per-subject random slopes of 
the relevant variables were included in the various models. Models of increasing complexity 
were compared, where the variables of interest (group2, reciprocity behaviour and trial 
number) and their interactions were added in sequential steps3. Regression coefficients and 
bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals are reported alongside inferential statistics as simple 
effect sizes (Baguley, 2009). 
                                               
2 The effect of nationality of the partner (Dutch, German, Italian, or French) was analysed 
additionally. The results were mostly similar to the group based results, showing that the expectations, 
investments, and ratings of especially the French partners resembled the outgroup pattern. 
Expectations and ratings of German and Italian partners were also higher than expectations and 
ratings of the Dutch partners. 
3 Moreover, several exploratory analyses were performed on the effect of age of the partner (range 18 
– 30 years) on investments in the Trust Game. Results showed higher trust in older partners. This 
effect did not confound the effects of group, reciprocity behaviour and sequential trial number on 
investments in the Trust Game. 




Trust Game. Based on a visual inspection of the data (see Figure 3), we decided to 
compare a linear model of the data to a non-linear square root model. This model consisted of 
the same main effects and interactions between group, reciprocity behaviour, and trial 
number, but included the square root effect of trial number instead of the linear effect. This 
square root model had a better fit to the data (AIC = 19573) than the linear model (AIC = 
19648), χ2 (0) = 74.53, p <.001. The square root effect of trial number indicated that the 
speed of change in investments decreased over time, with a steeper change in the first rounds 
of the game, and a flattening out during later rounds4. The fixed effects of this model alone 
explained 37% of the variance in the data. The addition of the random effects per subject 
increased the explained variance to 66%.  The results of the square root model will be 
reported here. 
Table 1          
Mean (Standard Deviations) Investments in the Trust Game in Study 1, for Group, 
Reciprocity Behaviour and Condition (Group x Reciprocity Behaviour Interaction) 
Group Investment 
Ingroup 5.09 tokens (1.82) 
Outgroup 5.54 tokens (1.49) 
difference t(35) = -2.43, p = .020, d = 0.27 
                                               
4 Not only is this non-linear square root model a more accurate fit to the data, it is in accordance with 
general models of learning over time (e.g. Sloan & Ostrom, 1974). 
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Reciprocity behaviour   
High reciprocity 7.47 tokens (1.98) 
Low reciprocity 3.16 tokens (1.89) 
difference t(35) = 11.36, p <.001, d = 2.22 
Condition (Group x Reciprocity)   
Ingroup-High 6.96 tokens (2.27) 
Outgroup-High 7.97 tokens (1.95) 
difference t(35) = -4.11, p <.001, d = 0.48 
Ingroup-Low 3.21 tokens (2.17) 
Outgroup-Low 3.11 tokens (1.85) 
difference t(35) = 0.43, p = .668, d = .05 
 
  In the full square root model, significant main effects of reciprocity behaviour, F(1, 
98) = 5.41, p = .022, B = 1.14, 95% CI [0.22, 2.06], and group, F(1, 575) = 9.69, p = .002, B 
= 1.13, 95% CI [0.42, 1.81], were found. As expected, participants invested more in partners 
that returned high amounts than in partners that returned low amounts. Surprisingly, across 
all rounds of the Trust Game, the outgroup received higher investments than the ingroup (see 
Table 1 for descriptive statistics). Higher investments for the outgroup were already observed 
in the first round of the game, t(35) = -2.52, p = .017, d = 0.37 (Mingroup = 4.61, SDingroup = 
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2.11; Moutgroup = 5.39, SDoutgroup = 2.05). The 3-way interaction of Group x Reciprocity x Trial 
was of most interest to our hypotheses. This 3-way interaction was marginally significant, 
F(1, 4172) = 3.64, p = .056, B = -0.30, 95% CI [-0.62, 0.01] (see Figure 3). Post-hoc analyses 
of the slopes indicated that only the slopes in the low reciprocity condition differed between 
the ingroup and outgroup, χ2(1) = 9.85, p = .003, where the slope of the outgroup was steeper 
(Boutgroup = -0.29, SEoutgroup = 0.02) than the slope of the ingroup (Bingroup = -0.20, SEingroup = 
0.02). The slopes of the ingroup (Bingroup = 0.28, SEingroup = 0.02) and outgroup (Boutgroup = 
0.26, SEoutgroup = 0.02) did not differ significantly in the high reciprocity condition, χ2(1) = 
0.16, p = .691.        
        a) b)   
Figure 3. Investments in the Trust Game in Study 1 over sequential trials with a partner (1 to 
15), for the different conditions: ingroup-high (red), outgroup-high (blue), ingroup-low 
(green), outgroup-low (purple). Figure 3a indicates the mean investment scores for each 
round and each condition. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Figure 3b shows the 
data points with regression lines for the square root effect of time, with separate lines for each 
condition. 
  Additionally, we compared investments during the last rounds of the game, to 
examine possible biases still present at the end of the game. Paired t-tests demonstrated that, 
for high reciprocating partners, outgroup partners still received higher investments in the last 
round of the game (M = 8.81, SD = 2.29) than ingroup members (M = 7.72, SD = 2.79), t(35) 
= -2.91, p = .006, d = 0.38. However, for low reciprocating partners, there was no difference 
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between last round investments between ingroup (M = 2.94, SD = 3.81) and outgroup 
partners (M = 2.06, SD = 2.87), t(35) = 1.35, p = .19, d = 0.14. 
         Ingroup identification and the Trust Game. No significant effects of ingroup 
identification on investment behaviour in the Trust Game were observed. The full model and 
all inferential statistics can be found in the online supplementary materials.   
         Expectations of return. A significant effect of group was found in the model 
predicting expectations of return, F(1, 249) = 22.78, p < .001, B = 8.06, 95% CI [4.90, 11.29]. 
Expectations of return were higher for the outgroup (Moutgroup = 47.31, SDoutgroup = 17.47) than 
for the ingroup (Mingroup = 39.79, SDingroup = 18.34). The effect of group on the certainty of the 
expectations was not significant (Mingroup = 39.09, SDingroup = 22.36; Moutgroup = 37.48, 
SDoutgroup = 21.50), F(1, 248) = 0.68, p = .42, B = -0.96, 95% CI [-3.30, 1.29].    
         Ratings of individual partners. The partner-rating index was used as the dependent 
variable in the linear multilevel model with group and reciprocity behaviour as within-subject 
factors. Results showed a significant main effect of reciprocity behaviour on partner ratings, 
F(1, 246) = 147.34, p < .001, B = 1.27, 95% CI [1.08, 1.49], and a significant Group x 
Reciprocity interaction, F(1, 246) = 7.34, p = .007, B = 0.40, 95% CI [0.09, 0.69]. See Figure 
4 and supplementary materials for descriptive statistics. We did not observe a significant 
main effect of group, F(1, 246) = 1.03, p = .310, B = -0.11, 95% CI [-0.32, 0.12]. Post-hoc 
paired t-tests indicate that only in the high reciprocity condition, the outgroup was rated more 
positively than the ingroup, t(34) = -3.34, p = .002, d = 0.57. In the low reciprocity 
conditions, partner ratings did not differ significantly between the groups, t(33) = 1.13, p = 
.269, d = 0.19. This is in line with the investment behaviour in the last rounds of the game.
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Figure 4. Mean partner ratings after the game for Study 1, separate for ingroup (red) and 
outgroup (blue) partners that showed high or low reciprocity behaviour. Error bars represent 
95% confidence intervals.  
  
Discussion 
In Study 1, we investigated how group membership of game partners influences 
learning about their trustworthiness over repeated interactions. Surprisingly, people 
demonstrated a preference to trust outgroup members, which affected trust amounts 
throughout the game, and even influenced player ratings after the game. Such outgroup 
preferences do occasionally occur (e.g. Jussim et al., 1987). Relatedly, and likely the 
motivation behind the subsequent trust decisions, before the game people indicated higher 
expectations for the outgroup than the ingroup.                 
  However, our main research question related to learning for trustworthy and 
untrustworthy group members over time. We observed that with initial trust being higher for 
the outgroup than the ingroup, trustworthy outgroup partners kept receiving higher 
investments than trustworthy ingroup partners throughout the game. However, for 
untrustworthy outgroup partners, investments decreased significantly faster than investments 
in untrustworthy ingroup partners, so that there was no difference in the ratings between 
groups after the game. These results are in line with complexity-extremity theory (CET; 
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Linville, 1982), showing that the investments for outgroup members are more extreme than 
for ingroup members. However, as investments in the last round were similar for 
untrustworthy ingroup and outgroup partners, the faster decrease in investments could also be 
explained by the initial bias towards the outgroup. Participants had to make a larger 
adjustment for outgroup untrustworthy partners to come to the same endpoint as the ingroup. 
Such an adjustment was not made in the trustworthy condition. 
We did not find any evidence for the Black Sheep Effect (BSE; Marques et al., 1988) 
in this experiment. We did not observe ingroup favouritism, there were no differences 
between ingroup and outgroup investments in untrustworthy partners towards the end of the 
game, and we found no effects of ingroup identification. 
Initial expectations in this study suggests that the participants viewed the outgroup as 
more trustworthy. This may be concordant with the general liberal attitudes demonstrated by 
university students in the Netherlands (van Leeuwen & Park, 2009). Perhaps it also could be 
related to ingroup stereotypes of the Dutch as more frugal than other cultures (Mlicki & 
Ellemers, 1996). Would this pattern hold in a different country with different national 
perceptions? Study 2 examines this possibility and attempts to replicate the extremity effects 
with a different sample. 
 
Study 2 
         Study 2 was a replication of Study 1, conducted in the United Kingdom. We expected 
to replicate the general pattern in the initial study, with more extreme investment behaviour 
emerging towards the outgroup than towards the ingroup. As an additional investigation, if 
the outgroup preferences found in Study 1 were caused by factors unique to our Dutch 
sample, we would expect to find ingroup preferences, particularly for those high in ingroup 
identification, as was originally hypothesised. However, other motives might also be at play. 
 GROUP BIAS AND LEARNING IN THE TRUST GAME                              18 
 
Social desirability and Motivation to Control Prejudice (MCP) scales were added to the study 




Participants and design.  Participants (N = 73 students5) were recruited via an online 
participant database. The data of 14 participants was removed from analysis due to double or 
foreign nationalities. The remaining 59 participants (86% female; Mage = 20.30 years, SDage = 
3.70 years) were of British nationality. Participants received course credit for their time and 
had a chance to win their average earnings in the game, converted to pounds (one token = 50 
pence). Each participant had a 1 in 6 chance to win the bonus, based on a dice roll. The 
design of Study 2 was similar to Study 1, with the addition of the social desirability and MCP 
scales as continuous variables predicting investments alongside group and reciprocity 
behaviour. 
  Materials and procedure. Only the differences with Study 1 will be described here. 
First, the eight partners that the participants played the game with consisted of four British 
partners and four foreign partners with the following nationalities: Dutch, Italian, Belgian and 
Austrian. Second, the information about the age of the partner, which was shown next to the 
figure that represented the partner in Study 1, was only provided initially due to unexpected 
                                               
5 The sample size for Study 2 was increased from Study 1 due to the addition of the individual 
difference measures of social desirability and MCP.  We performed another power analysis in 
GPower 3.1, which now included eight groups: 2 (group) x 2 (reciprocity behaviour) x 2 (social 
desirability/MCP). All other parameters were set the same as the power analysis for Study 1. This 
resulted in a sample size of 72. Due to more exclusions than anticipated, our final sample size was 59. 
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effects of age of the partner found in Study 12. The figures representing each individual 
partner now only consisted of the figure with the colours of the flag and the initials. 
  Third, participants were presented with the social desirability and MCP scales at the 
end of the study. The social desirability scale consisted of sixteen items and was adapted 
from Stöber (2001). Higher scores indicated increased social desirability (α = 0.67). Next, 
participants completed the 10-item Motivation to Control Prejudice (MCP) scale (Plant & 
Devine, 1998). Higher scores indicated a greater motivation to control prejudice (α = 0.72). 
The full procedure was again approved by a research ethics committee before data collection 
commenced. 
  Data analysis.  The same analyses were performed on the data of the Trust Game as 
in Study 16. The standardised scores from the social desirability questionnaire and the MCP 
scale were added to the full model of investments in the Trust Game. 
 
Results 
Trust Game. We again compared a linear and square root model, and the square root 
model resulted in a better fit (AIC = 31605) to the data than the linear model (AIC = 31642), 
χ2(0) = 36.56, p < .001. The fixed effects of this model alone explained 15% of the variance 
in the data. The random effects per subject increased the explained variance to 59%. We will 
report the results of the model including a square root effect of trial. 
                                               
6 The effect of nationality of the partner (British, Italian, Dutch, Belgian, and Austrian) was again 
analysed. The results were mostly similar to the group based results, showing that especially the 
investments in the Belgian partner differed from the British partners, and expectations and ratings of 
the Italian partner differed from the British partners. Participants’ behaviour towards each national 
outgroup pointed in the same direction, and was different from behaviour towards British partners. 
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  In the full model, significant main effects of reciprocity behaviour, F(1, 272) = 5.23, p 
= .023, B = 0.75, 95% CI [0.10, 1.39], and trial number, F(1, 136) = 55.77, p <.001, B = 0.70, 
95% CI [0.52, 0.87], were found. Participants invested more in partners that returned high 
amounts than in partners that returned low amounts (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics). 
Furthermore, there was a linear, positive trend in investments over trials. As part of the full 
model, the main effect of group was not significant, F(1, 783) = 1.04, p = .307, B = 0.28, 
95% CI [-0.25, 0.77] (see Table 2), although in the first round people again invested more in 
the outgroup (M = 5.17, SD = 2.60) than the ingroup (M = 4.63, SD = 2.41), t(58) = 2.04, p = 
.046, d = 0.22. 
Table 2          
Mean (Standard Deviations) Investments in the Trust Game in Study 2, for Group, 
Reciprocity Behaviour and Condition (Group x Reciprocity Behaviour Interaction) 
Group Investment 
Ingroup 5.23 tokens (2.11) 
Outgroup 5.42 tokens (1.95) 
difference t(58) = -1.23, p = .225, d = 0.09 
Reciprocity behaviour   
High reciprocity 6.53 tokens (2.31) 
Low reciprocity 4.12 tokens (1.95) 
difference t(58) = -10.55, p <.001, d = 1.13 
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Condition (Group x Reciprocity)   
Ingroup-High 6.36 tokens (3.18) 
Outgroup-High 6.71 tokens (2.86) 
difference t(58) = -1.80, p = .077, d = 0.14 
Ingroup-Low 4.11 tokens (3.26) 
Outgroup-Low 4.13 tokens (3.11) 
difference t(58) = -0.11, p = .912, d = 0.01 
 
         The 3-way Group x Reciprocity x Trial interaction between was of most interest for 
our hypotheses. This 3-way interaction was marginally significant, F(1, 6840) = 3.67, p = 
.055, B = -0.23, 95% CI [-0.47, -0.00]. Post-hoc analyses of the slopes indicated that, again, 
only the slopes in the low reciprocity condition differed between the ingroup and outgroup, 
χ2(1) = 6.27, p = .025, where the slope of the outgroup (Boutgroup = -0.19, SEoutgroup = 0.021) 
was steeper than the slope of the ingroup (Bingroup = -0.12, SEingroup = 0.014). The slopes of the 
ingroup (Bingroup = 0.21, SE-ingroup = 0.016) and outgroup (Boutgroup = 0.21, SEoutgroup = 0.015) 
did not differ significantly in the high reciprocity condition, χ2(1) = 0.07, p = .789 (see Figure 
5). 
         Again, we also compared investments during the last rounds of the game. The paired 
t-tests showed a marginally significant difference between ingroup (M = 7.32, SD = 3.28) and 
outgroup (M = 7.78, SD = 2.88) investments for high reciprocating partners, t(58) = -1.68, p = 
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.099, d = 0.22, but no significant difference for low reciprocating partners, t(58) = -0.40, p = 
.69, d = 0.05 (Moutgroup = 3.59, SDoutgroup = 3.28; Mingroup = 3.44, SDingroup = 3.45). 
a)    b)  
Figure 5. Investments in the Trust Game in Study 2 over sequential trials with a partner (1 to 
15), for the different conditions: ingroup-high (red), outgroup-high (blue), ingroup-low 
(green), outgroup-low (purple). Figure 5a indicates the mean investment scores for each 
round and each condition. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Figure 5b shows the 
data points with regression lines for the square root effect of time, with separate lines for each 
condition. 
         Group identification and the Trust Game. We observed a significant main effect of 
identification, indicating that participants with higher reported identification with the ingroup 
made higher investments overall, F(1, 47) = 5.09, p = .029, B = 0.77, 95% CI [0.14, 1.41]. 
More interestingly, the Group x Identification interaction was significant, F(1, 83) = 16.40, p 
< .001, B = -0.58, 95% CI [-0.87, -0.29]. The slope of the ingroup (Bingroup = 0.30, SEingroup = 
0.09) was steeper than the outgroup (Boutgroup = 0.11, SEoutgroup = 0.09). Low identifiers 
showed higher investments in the outgroup than the ingroup, while high identifiers showed 
the classic pattern of ingroup bias, with higher investments in the ingroup than the outgroup. 
Expectations of return. Participants did not differ in the expectations for partners 
from the ingroup or outgroup, F(1, 411) = 2.27, p = .133, B = 2.04, 95% CI [-0.61, 4.70]. 
However, participants were more certain about their expectations about the ingroup, (Mingroup 
= 47.34 % certain, SDingroup = 25.11; F(1, 412) = 26.44, p < .001, B = -6.15, 95% CI [-8.58, -
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3.71]), than about the outgroup, (Moutgroup = 41.18 % certain, SDoutgroup = 23.71). 
  We observed a significant Identification x Group interaction, F(1, 411) = 12.93, p < 
.001, B = -4.88, 95% CI [-7.36, -2.25]. This interaction indicated that low identifiers expected 
more from outgroup members than ingroup members (as was the general pattern in Study 1), 
while high identifiers had higher expectations for ingroup members than outgroup members. 
The slope for the ingroup was slightly positive (Bingroup = .06, SEingroup = 0.11), while the 
slope for the outgroup was negative (Boutgroup = -0.19, SEoutgroup = 0.10).          
  Ratings of individual partners. There were significant main effects of both group, 
F(1, 410) = 6.79, p = .010, B = 0.27, 95% CI [0.07, 0.48], and reciprocity behaviour, F(1, 
410) = 97.80, p < .001, B = -1.02, 95% CI [-1.22, -0.81], on the partner ratings. Ratings were 
more positive for high reciprocity partners than for low reciprocity partners, and higher for 
outgroup members than for ingroup members (see Figure 6, and supplementary materials for 
descriptive statistics). Paired t-tests indicated that the difference in rating between ingroup 
and outgroup partners was significant for high reciprocating partners, t(58) = -2.94, p = .005, 
d = 0.38, but not for low reciprocating partners, t(58) = -1.05, p = .296, d = 0.14. This is in 
line with the last round of investments for partners from different conditions. The Group x 
Reciprocity interaction was not significant, F(1, 410) = 1.60, p = .206, B = -0.18, 95% CI [-
0.48, 0.09]. 
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Figure 6. Mean partner ratings after the game for Study 2, separate for ingroup (red) and 
outgroup (blue) partners that showed high or low reciprocity behaviour. Error bars represent 
95% confidence intervals. 
         Social desirability and the Trust Game. No significant effects of social desirability 
were found on investments in the Trust Game. The full description of the performed analyses 
and inferential statistics can be found in the supplementary materials.  
         Motivation to control prejudice and the Trust Game.  We only observed a 
significant main effect of MCP on investments in the Trust Game, F(1, 72) = 4.09, p = .047, 
B = -0.70, 95% CI [-1.38, -0.06]. There was an overall tendency for people with higher MCP 
scores to invest less. No significant MCP x Group interaction was found, F(1, 99) = 2.82, p = 
.096, B = -0.26, 95% CI [-0.56, 0.04], nor MCP x Reciprocity, F(1, 73) = 1.68, p = .20, B = 
0.30, 95% CI [-0.13, 0.77]. 
 
Discussion 
         The results of Study 2 generally replicate the results of Study 1. As expected, there 
was a strong effect of the behaviour of a partner (i.e. reciprocity behaviour) on the amount of 
trust placed in him/her, and a small overall effect of the partners’ group membership, 
showing slight outgroup favouritism. Importantly, we again observed that investments in the 
outgroup remained significantly higher than investments in the ingroup for trustworthy 
partners, but decreased more quickly for untrustworthy partners. This led to similar levels of 
(low) investment in both untrustworthy ingroup and outgroup members by the end of the 
game. Again, this could be due to trust behaviour having an outsized effect for outgroup 
members, or because of initial outgroup favouritism. The latter would lead to a larger 
adjustment of investments towards untrustworthy outgroup partners to arrive at the same 
point as untrustworthy ingroup partners.  
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  Together, the results of Study 1 and Study 2 show that people initially trust outgroup 
partners more than ingroup partners. This outgroup bias continues when learning about 
trustworthy partners, but investments in untrustworthy outgroup partners decrease more 
quickly so that no group bias is present for untrustworthy partners at the end of the game. 
This pattern of investments is also reflected in ratings of partners after the game. Unlike 
Study 1, here ingroup identification was related to patterns of ingroup and outgroup 
investments and expectations of return. Low identifiers displayed outgroup bias and high 
identifiers displayed ingroup bias. However, the effect of ingroup identification did not 
influence the relative effects of investment behaviour. There was no evidence that this effect 
is caused by social desirability concerns. 
   Framing the outgroup as people from different foreign nationalities might be argued 
to be problematic. These different nationalities might not have made a very cohesive out-
group, but instead created multiple out-groups, which can lead to multiple categorization (for 
a review, see Crisp & Hewstone, 2007). Moreover, it is possible that people held 
stereotypical beliefs related to trustworthiness and generosity about the different nationalities. 
Therefore, Study 3 focussed on one particular nationality to represent the outgroup, namely 
Austrian. This nationality was pre-tested to be perceived as similar to the British on the 
aforementioned traits (see supplementary materials). The change in target outgroup to a 
relatively unknown nationality was predicted to reduce initial bias. This reduction would 
demonstrate whether initial outgroup favouritism is driving the magnitude of change in 
investments over time for trustworthy and untrustworthy ingroup and outgroup members. 
Otherwise we would expect that, due to low complexity of the outgroup, we again observe 
more extreme investment behaviour towards outgroup partners.  
 
Study 3 
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Study 3 was conducted to examine how group membership can influence learning 
about trustworthiness when an initial bias is reduced, and further to examine the underlying 
processes that could explain the findings of the first two studies. While previously we could 
infer learning from behavioural responses to both trustworthy and untrustworthy partners, this 
could be explained by a variety of mechanisms. Therefore, we included here measures of 
perceptions of trustworthiness, expectations, and affective responses towards the partners in 
the game, as these are relevant theoretical components of trust that could help clarify the 
responsible processes (Lewicki, Tomlinson, & Gillespie, 2006; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 
1995; McAllister, 1995). These three measures target both impressions of the person (affect 
and trustworthiness), as well as expectations about behaviour, which could be perceived as a 
separate construct from person perceptions of trustworthiness (Newman & Uleman, 1993). 
These ratings were measured at three different time points: before the start of the Trust Game, 
during the game itself, and after completing the Trust Game. Using this design, we could 
examine how changes in investments throughout the game are related to changes in 
trustworthiness perceptions, expectations, and affect. 
  We predicted that if initial outgroup favouritism is no longer present, then two 
scenarios are possible. Firstly, if changes in investment behaviour can be explained by 
complexity-extremity theory (CET; Linville, 1982), we would expect similar findings as in 
Study 1 and 2. Investments in trustworthy outgroup members would increase quicker than 
investments in trustworthy ingroup members, and investments in untrustworthy outgroup 
members would decrease quicker than investments in untrustworthy ingroup members. 
Secondly, if adjustments after initial outgroup favouritism are driving differences in slopes, 
but not changes in the perceptions of trustworthiness, then we would expect that investments 
in ingroup and outgroup members would increase or decrease at similar rates. 
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With regard to the underlying processes, we predict that perceptions of 
trustworthiness, expectations, and affective responses towards the partners will change along 
with the investment behaviour in the game. However, as each of these factors may play a 
significant role, we do not specify a directional hypothesis regarding which would be the 
optimal predictor of the changes in investment amount. 
 
Methods 
         Participants and design. Participants (N = 134 students7) were recruited via an 
online participant database. The data of 27 participants was removed from analysis due to 
foreign or double nationalities. The remaining 107 participants (86% female; Mage = 20.30 
years, SDage = 3.70 years) were of British nationality. Participants received course credit for 
their time, and had a chance to win their average earnings in the game, converted to pounds, 
in the same manner as in Study 2. 
         The design of Study 3 was similar to the first two studies, with additional measures 
added at different time points (pre-game, during-game, post-game). These measures are 
treated as both dependent and independent variables for different analyses (see data analysis 
section). 
         Materials and procedure. Only the differences with Study 1 are described here. 
First, the nationality of the outgroup was changed to only represent one country instead of 
four different foreign nationalities. Based on a pilot study run on a sample from the same 
pool of students as used in the main experiment, Austria was chosen as the country that was 
                                               
7 The sample size was based on power calculations using the coefficient and standard error of the 
three-way interaction of interest from Study 2. Formulas were derived from Snijders (2005), but 
ignored the design effect. See preregistration materials on osf.io/3vney/ for the MatLab script. 
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most similar in people’s stereotype perceptions of trustworthiness and generosity as Britain 
(see supplementary materials for a description of the pilot and results). 
  Second, we adapted the questionnaires about expectations of the partners and ratings 
of trustworthiness of the partners. Instead of only asking for expectations before the game 
and judgments after the game, we implemented three time points for measures throughout the 
experiment: pre-game, during-game, and post-game. Before the game started (pre-game), 
participants were presented with a short 7-item in-group identification questionnaire 
(Cinnirella, 1997) a feeling thermometer towards Austrian people, and a 6-item semantic 
differential scale adapted from Terracciano et al. (2005) to measure stereotype perceptions of 
trustworthiness and generosity of both British and Austrian people (α = 0.73). 
         Next, participants were asked to rate the individual partners in the game on 
trustworthiness (very untrustworthy to very trustworthy), expectations of return in the game 
(very unlikely to reciprocate to very likely to reciprocate), and general affect towards the 
partner (very cold to very warm). Participants rated each of the partners on these three traits 
on a 100-point slider scale. After providing these ratings, participants started with the game. 
         The during-game measurement took place after completing seven out of the 15 rounds 
with an individual partner, in which the above ratings of trustworthiness, expectations, and 
affect were repeated8. The post-game ratings of each partner occurred immediately after 
completing the game and receiving information about the average earnings in the game. 
Finally, participants were again presented with the feeling thermometer towards Austrian 
people and the 7-item semantic differential scale to measure changes in stereotype 
perceptions of British and Austrian people.  
                                               
8 As the order of the game rounds was fully randomised, the exact moment of the during-game ratings 
came at different points for each partner and for each participant. 
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         Data analysis. The data analysis consisted of three consecutive models. First, the 
same analysis was performed as in the first two studies, where we examined the effect of 
group membership of the partner (ingroup vs outgroup), trustworthiness of behaviour of the 
partner (high vs low), and trial number (game round 1 to 15) on investments in the game 
using linear multilevel models. Second, the effect of changes in trustworthiness judgments, 
expectations of return, and affective responses (i.e. post-game minus pre-game difference 
scores) on changes in investments in the game (i.e. round 15 minus round one investment 
difference scores) were examined. Third, the effect of group membership, trustworthiness, 
and time (pre-game, during-game, post-game) on the ratings of the partners was examined. 
We created separate linear multilevel models for trustworthiness judgments, expectations of 
return, and affective responses as outcome variables. Differences in stereotype perceptions 
and outgroup feelings before and after the game were also examined, these results can be 
found in the supplementary materials.  
 
Results 
         The Trust Game behaviour was analysed on two levels. The first level examined the 
effect of group, behaviour, and time, on the investments in the game, and the second level 
explored how changes in trustworthiness, expectations, and affect predicted changes in 
investments during the game. 
         Level one analysis. The square root model of group, reciprocity behaviour, and trial 
number resulted in a better fit to the data (AIC = 56057) than the linear model (AIC = 56166), 
χ2(0) = 109, p < .001. The fixed effects of this model alone explained 25% of the variance in 
the data. The random effects per subject increased the explained variance to 59%. We will 
report the results of the model including a square root effect of trial.          
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         In the full model, significant main effects of reciprocity behaviour, F(1, 282) = 32.05, 
p < .001, B = 1.56, 95% CI [1.01, 2.09], and trial number, F(1, 269) = 101.65, p <.001, B = 
0.62, 95% CI [0.50, 0.74], were found. Participants invested more in partners that returned 
high amounts than in partners that returned low amounts (see Table 3 for descriptive 
statistics). Furthermore, there was a linear, positive trend in investments over trials. As part of 
the full model, the main effect of group was not significant, F(1, 960) = 0.17, p = .679, B = -
0.01, 95% CI [-0.50, 0.31]. No initial (first round) bias was observed towards either the 
ingroup (M = 4.90 tokens, SD = 2.02) or the outgroup (M = 4.99, SD = 2.20), t(106) = -0.60, 
p = .553, d = 0.04. 
Table 3         
Mean (Standard Deviations) Investments in the Trust Game in Study 3, for Group, 
Reciprocity Behaviour and Condition (Group x Reciprocity Behaviour Interaction) 
Group Investment 
Ingroup  4.32 tokens (1.61) 
Outgroup  4.70 tokens (1.76) 
difference t(106) = -3.20, p = .002, d = 0.25 
Reciprocity behaviour   
High reciprocity  5.95 tokens (2.21) 
Low reciprocity  3.06 tokens (1.81) 
difference t(106) = -13.24, p < .001, d = 1.63 
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Condition (Group x Reciprocity)   
Ingroup-High  5.72 tokens (2.52) 
Outgroup-High  6.19 tokens (2.52) 
difference t(106) = -2.53, p = .013, d = 0.21 
Ingroup-Low  2.92 tokens (1.82) 
Outgroup-Low  3.21 tokens (1.91) 
difference t(106) = -3.77, p < .001, d = 0.18 
 
         The 3-way interaction Group x Reciprocity x Trial number was not significant, F(1, 
12408) = 0.46, p = .498, B = -0.06, 95% CI [-0.23, 0.11]. However, the Group x Trial 
interaction, F(1, 12408) = 11.21, p < .001, B = 0.20, 95% CI [0.08, 0.32], and Reciprocity x 
Trial interaction, F(1, 12408) = 708.43, p < .001, B = -1.62, 95% CI [-1.73, -1.50], were 
found to be significant. Investments in high reciprocating partners increased over time (B = 
0.22, SE = 0.01, p < .001), while investments in low reciprocating partners decreased over 
time (B = -0.29, SE = 0.01, p < .001). The Group x Trial interaction showed that, over trials, 
investments in the ingroup decreased, (B = -0.06, SE = 0.01, p < .001), while investments in 
the outgroup did not change, (B = 0.00, SE = 0.01, p = .759). 
          A comparison of the slopes of all the conditions showed that, for highly reciprocating 
partners, the outgroup slope (B = 0.26, SE = 0.01) was steeper than the ingroup slope (B = 
0.19, SE = 0.01), χ2(1) = 11.54, p = .001. However, for low reciprocating partners, the 
outgroup slope was less steep (B = -0.26, SE = 0.01) than the ingroup slope (B = -0.31, SE = 
 GROUP BIAS AND LEARNING IN THE TRUST GAME                              32 
 
0.01), χ2(1) = 5.88, p = .015, see Figure 7. The 3-way interaction is not significant because 
for both high and low reciprocating partners, outgroup members receive higher investments 
over time than do ingroup members.  
  a) b)  
Figure 7. Investments in the Trust Game for Study 3 over sequential trials with a partner (1 to 
15), for the different conditions: ingroup-high (red), outgroup-high (blue), ingroup-low 
(green), outgroup-low (purple). Figure 7a indicates the mean investment scores for each 
round and each condition. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Figure 7b shows the 
data points with regression lines for the square root effect of time, with separate lines for each 
condition. 
  We also compared last round investments for high and low reciprocating ingroup and 
outgroup partners. As in Study 2, the difference in last round investment between highly 
reciprocating ingroup (M = 6.21, SD = 3.36) and outgroup partners (M = 6.82, SD = 3.29) 
was marginally significant, t(106) = -1.77, p = .080, d = 0.17. There was no significant 
difference between investments in ingroup (M = 1.92, SD = 2.50) and outgroup partners (M = 
2.10, SD = 2.43) that did not reciprocate trust, t(106) = -0.88, p = .380, d = 0.09. 
  Level two analysis. For the second level of analysis, difference scores were 
computed. The outcome variable was the difference score between the investment in the last 
round with a partner (round 15) subtracting the investment in the first round with a partner 
(round 1). The main predictors were the difference scores between the partner ratings after 
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the game (trust – postgame, expectation-postgame, affect-postgame) and the partner ratings 
before the game (trust –pregame, expectation-pregame, affect-pregame). 
         A linear multilevel model was created with the difference scores for trustworthiness, 
expectations, and affect, predicting the investment difference score. A per subject random 
slope was added to account for the repeated measures design. The fixed effects of this model 
alone explained 58% of the variance in the data. The random effects per subject increased the 
explained variance to 68%. This model showed significant effects of expectations, F(1, 827) 
= 58.46, p < .001, B = 0.47, 95% CI [0.35, 0.59], affect, F(1, 850) = 13.07, p < .001, B = 
0.21, 95% CI [0.10, 0.32], and trustworthiness, F(1, 845) = 4.06, p = .044, B = 0.13, 95% CI 
[0.00, 0.25] on the investment difference score. The coefficients of this regression model 
show that all difference scores of partner ratings have a positive relation with the difference 
scores in investments. However, the effect of expectations and affect are stronger than the 
effect of trustworthiness judgments.  
  Additionally, correlations were examined between the difference scores of 
trustworthiness, expectations, and affective responses. It was found that all three of the 
difference scores of partner ratings were highly correlated (see Table 4).  
Table 4 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations with Confidence Intervals of the Partner 
Rating Difference Scores 
Variable M SD 1 2 
     
1. Trustworthiness  
post-pre 
-8.09 33.23   
      
2. Expectation post-pre -4.30 35.48 .91**  
      
3. Affect post-pre -5.66 31.47 .91** .88** 
          
Note. * indicates p < .05; ** indicates p < .01. M and SD are used to represent mean and 
standard deviation, respectively.  
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  Lastly, we also examined to what extend the ratings of trustworthiness, expectations, 
and affect were predictive of first round investments in the game. The pre-game ratings were 
regressed onto the first round investment with each partner, using a multilevel model 
including a per-subject random effect. This model showed that only expectations of return 
significantly predicted the first-round investment, F(1, 847) = 12.15, p < .001, B = 0.12, 95% 
CI [0.05, 0.19]. Ratings of trustworthiness, F(1, 836) = 0.00, p = .984, B = 0.00, 95% CI [-
0.06, 0.06], and ratings of affect towards the partners, F(1, 824) = 0.24, p = .625, B = -0.02, 
95% CI [0.09, 0.05], both did not significantly predict first round investments.    
         Partner ratings. To examine changes in ratings of trustworthiness, expectations, and 
affect over time, the effects of group, reciprocity behaviour, and time (pre-game, during-
game, post-game) were examined on each of the partner ratings in separate linear multilevel 
models9. All models contained per subject random intercepts and random slopes for group, 
reciprocity behaviour, time, and the interaction between group and reciprocity behaviour. As 
the results of the three models are very similar, they are described together in this section (see 
Figure 8 and supplementary materials). 
         For each of the outcome ratings (trustworthiness, expectations, and affect), the 
Reciprocity x Time interaction was significant. Trustworthiness, F(2, 1920) = 175.55, p < 
.001, Bpre-during = 1.34, Bpre - post = 1.54, 95% CIs [1.16, 1.51], [1.37, 1.71]
10; expectation, 
                                               
9 Upon inspection of the data, it was discovered that a coding error had prevented the data of the 
affect ratings during the game to be recorded correctly. Therefore, any comparisons with the affect 
during-game ratings were removed from analysis.  
10 As the variable time has three levels (pregame, during game, postgame), the model creates two 
dummy variables. The beta coefficients and 95% confidence intervals of both these dummy variables 
(pre-during, pre-post) are reported. However, as the during-game ratings of affect were not accidently 
not recorded correctly and cannot be used, only one coefficient is reported for affect (pre-post).  
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F(2,1920) = 207.60, p < .001, Bpre-during = 1.47, Bpre- post = 1.57, 95% CIs [1.30, 1.64], [1.41, 
1.74]; affect, F(1,1279) = 257.08, p < .001, Bpre - post = 1.51, 95% CI [1.32, 1.70].  
Post-hoc multilevel models of pregame, during, and postgame subsets revealed that partner 
ratings of high and low reciprocating partners did not differ before the game, but did differ 
significantly during and after the game (see Figure 8 and supplementary materials for the 
outcomes of post-hoc tests). Highly reciprocating partners were always rated more positively 
than low reciprocating partners were. 
         The Group x Time interaction was not significant for trustworthiness ratings, F(2, 
1920) = 2.06, p = .128, Bpre-during = 0.06, Bpre – post = 0.20, 95% CIs [-0.12, 0.22], [0.02, 0.38], 
and expectations ratings, F(2, 1920) = 2.00. p = .135, Bpre-during = 0.01, Bpre- post = 0.17, 95% 
CIs [-0.15, 0.18], [0.01, 0.34]. However, the interaction was significant for affect ratings, F(1, 
1279) = 8.86, p = .003, Bpre- post = 0.28, 95% CI [0.10, 0.46]. Ratings of ingroup and outgroup 
partners were not significantly different before and during the game, but the outgroup 
partners were rated more positively than ingroup partners after the game (see Figure 8 and 
supplementary materials). The Group x Reciprocity interaction behaviour was not significant, 
the outgroup was rated more positively than the ingroup after the game for both high and low 
reciprocating partners. 
 
a) b) c)  
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Figure 8. Mean partner ratings before, during, and after the game. Separate bars are presented 
for the four conditions: ingroup-low (red), outgroup-low (green), ingroup-high (blue), 
outgroup-high (purple). Figure 8a shows trustworthiness ratings; figure 8b shows 
expectations; figure 8c shows affect ratings. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.  
  Moreover, correlations were examined between the ratings of trustworthiness, 
expectations, and affective responses that were provided before, during, and after the Trust 
Game. While trustworthiness ratings, expectations, and affective responses towards the 
partners before the game were correlated between r(854) = .60, p < .001, and r(854) = .66, p 
< .001, correlations increased to r(854) = .91, p < .001 during the game. The correlation 
between expectations and trustworthiness ratings of partners after the game remained very 
high at r(854) = .95, p < .001. Meanwhile, the correlations between expectations and 
affective responses, r(854) = .64, p < .001, and between affective responses and 
trustworthiness ratings, r(854) = .64, p < .001, reduced again to be similar to the measures 
before the game (see supplementary materials for full correlation tables).  
  Ingroup identification. No significant effects of ingroup identification were observed 
in any of the models described above. Inferential statistics of the analyses can be found in the 
supplementary materials.  
 
Discussion 
         In this third study, we aimed to replicate the findings from the first two studies while 
considering several additional factors. First, to rule out the influence of stereotype 
perceptions of particular foreign nationalities, the outgroup here consisted of Austrian people, 
a national group that was found to be stereotypically perceived as very similar to British 
people in a pilot study. Second, a number of partner ratings were included before, during, and 
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after the Trust Game to measure how trustworthiness perceptions, expectations of return, and 
affective responses towards the different partners changed throughout the game. 
          In contrast to the first two studies, here we did not observe any initial bias towards 
the outgroup. There was no difference between first round investments in ingroup or 
outgroup partners, and the ratings before the game were similar for ingroup and outgroup 
partners. We predicted this from the change of outgroup to Austrian people, as Austrians are 
a relatively unknown group that was stereotyped as having similar trustworthiness levels to 
the British, as observed in the pilot study (see supplementary materials). However, it should 
be noted that we cannot conclusively state that the lack of initial outgroup bias is caused by 
the similarity in stereotype perceptions of trustworthiness between Austrians and British 
people. It is also possible that people did not have any stereotypes about Austrians 
beforehand and therefore projected their views of British people onto this relatively unknown 
European group. Perhaps when groups are seen as stereotypically similar, learning is less 
divergent for ingroups and outgroups compared to situations in which the outgroup is 
unknown and therefore people have no stable mental representations of them.    
  Regardless, an outgroup preference did develop throughout the game. This was 
reflected in the investment slopes over time, where the slope for high reciprocating outgroup 
partners was steeper than the slope for high reciprocating ingroup partners, but less steep for 
low reciprocating outgroup partners than low reciprocating ingroup partners. By the last 
round of the game, this outgroup bias was still present for high trustworthy partners, but 
investments in low trustworthy partners again did not differ between ingroup and outgroup. 
         The developing outgroup bias over time was also visible in the partner ratings. Before 
the game, people showed similar expectations, trustworthiness ratings, and affective 
responses towards both ingroup and outgroup members. However, after the game, outgroup 
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partners were rated more positively than ingroup partners on all three factors. This outgroup 
bias was visible in both high and low reciprocating partners.  
         We examined to what extent expectations, trustworthiness ratings, and affective 
responses could explain the changes in investments over time. All three factors were found to 
relate strongly to investments in the game, where a stronger positive change in the ratings 
predicted a stronger positive change in investments throughout the game. Moreover, the 
ratings of trustworthiness, expectations, and affect were all highly correlated with each other. 
When all three factors were entered into the model simultaneously, the effect of 
trustworthiness was strongly reduced. This could mean that expectations of return and 
affective responses taken together explain the trustworthiness ratings. The high correlations 
between the rating scores indicate that perhaps the impression of trustworthiness of the 
person and the expectations of trustworthy behaviour are not separate constructs, but are 
indicators of the same construct. We will elaborate more on this in the general discussion. 
         In summary, Study 3 showed that even when no initial bias is present, people are still 
affected by group membership in how they learn about the trustworthiness of others. For 
highly trustworthy partners, outgroup members were trusted more than similarly behaving 
ingroup members over time. This pattern of behaviour was also observed in Study 1 and 
Study 2, and supports complexity-extremity theory (CET). However, here investments 
decreased at a slower rate for untrustworthy outgroup partners than for ingroup partners, in 
contrast to Study 1 and Study 2. At the end of the game, people showed equally low amounts 
of trust towards untrustworthy outgroup and ingroup partners, which was also observed in 
Studies 1 and 2. In this study, outgroup partners were rated somewhat higher on perceived 
trustworthiness, expectations of return, and affective responses after the game. This could be 
due to a general motivation to treat the outgroup positively (Henry, 2008). 
  The changes in investments over time for untrustworthy outgroup and ingroup 
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partners indicate that the findings are more nuanced than can be predicted solely by CET. 
Investments in untrustworthy partners in Study 3 were similar for ingroup and outgroup 
partners without an initial outgroup favouritism. This suggests that group membership 
becomes less influential over time when experiencing negative interactions. Both 
untrustworthy ingroup and outgroup partners are distrusted equally, while outgroup partners 
receive higher degrees of trust when interactions are positive. 
 
General discussion 
         Three studies examined the effect of group biases, based on nationality, on learning 
about individuals’ trustworthiness in a repeated Trust Game. In the first two studies, we 
observed that participants initially invested more in outgroup members than ingroup 
members. Over time, they continued to do so when the partners were reciprocating 
trustworthy behaviour, and they generally rated outgroup partners more positively. However, 
when the partners did not reciprocate trust, participants decreased their investments in 
outgroup members to a greater degree than for ingroup members. In the third study, in which 
initial outgroup bias was not present, participants showed outgroup favourability over time. 
This was evidenced by investments and partner ratings, particularly for high trustworthy 
partners. Investments in untrustworthy outgroup partners decreased less strongly, but by the 
end of the game ingroup and outgroup members did not differ.  
 Differences Between High and Low Trustworthy Partners  
  We saw clear effects for interactions with high trustworthy partners. Studies 1 and 2 
began with positive outgroup bias, and this bias remained as overall trusting behaviour 
increased throughout the study. In Study 3, there was no initial bias, but overall trusting 
behaviour increased quicker for partners belonging to the outgroup, compared to those in the 
ingroup. The same pattern was also observed in partner ratings; ratings of trustworthy 
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outgroup members were higher than ratings of trustworthy ingroup partners after the game. 
The positive bias towards trustworthy outgroup members offers support for Linville’s 
complexity-extremity theory (Linville, 1982), as applied to actual decision-making 
behaviour. Whilst in Studies 1 and 2, participants seemed to carry on an initial outgroup bias, 
the lack of initial outgroup favouritism in Study 3 particularly supports this complexity-
extremity perspective as applied to trustworthy behaviour.    
  The effects for low trustworthy partners were slightly more nuanced. In Studies 1 and 
2 the slope in investments for untrustworthy partners was steeper for the outgroup than the 
ingroup. In Study 3, there was a slightly steeper decrease in investments for untrustworthy 
ingroup partners compared to outgroup partners. However, in all three studies there was no 
difference between the amount invested in the ingroup and the outgroup in the last round. 
This suggests that, although group membership had an initial influence on investments, its 
importance decreased once experience became available. Consistent with the well-known 
negativity bias in memory and person perception (Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Skowronski & 
Carlston, 1989), perhaps participants individuated the untrustworthy partners more than they 
did with highly trustworthy partners.   
 Interestingly, Study 3 showed that partner ratings were more positive for the outgroup 
for both high and low trustworthy partners after the game, which suggests a general bias 
towards the outgroup. In a situation in which the outgroup and the ingroup behaved similarly 
overall, participants rated the outgroup more favourably. Study 3 further tested the effect of 
expectations, affect, and perceived trustworthiness on investment behaviour. We found that 
all three had a significant effect. Looking at the regression coefficients, the importance of 
trustworthiness is reduced when included with expectation and affect. This in not necessarily 
surprising, as positive feelings and expectation of behaviour are theoretical components of 
perceived trustworthiness (Lewicki et al., 2006; Mayer et al., 1995; McAllister, 1995).
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 Trustworthiness ratings, expectations of return, and affective responses were highly 
correlated with each other and were all highly predictive of changes in investment behaviour. 
From these findings, we can infer that the impression of trustworthiness of the person and the 
characterisation of the trustworthiness behaviour are integrated and perceived as the same 
construct predicting trust behaviour. However, the ratings of partners before experience 
became available in the Trust Game were less highly correlated then ratings during and after 
the game, particularly the correlation between the trustworthiness rating and the expectations 
of return. Additionally, we found that at the start of the game only expectations of return 
predicted investment behaviour, while all three ratings were significant predictors of 
investments over the whole game. This might indicate that people’s impressions of the person 
and their expectations of the behaviour of the person were still perceived by people as 
separate constructs when no information about behaviour was available. However, while 
interacting with the different partners and information about behaviour became available, the 
impression of the person and expectation of behaviour were integrated and perceived as the 
same construct.  
Relation to Complexity-Extremity Theory 
  These results are more nuanced than would be predicted by CET. All three studies 
show support for CET for highly trustworthy partners. Regardless of initial outgroup 
favouritism, people over time showed higher trust in outgroup partners than ingroup partners. 
However, the findings for untrustworthy partners show that initial levels of bias do influence 
the changes in investments as well. When initial outgroup favouritism was present, people 
decreased their investments in outgroup partners more quickly than investments in equally 
untrustworthy ingroup partners, and ended with similar low levels of trust towards both 
groups. When there was no initial bias, the decrease in investments was less steep for 
outgroup than ingroup partners, but again people ended up similarly distrusting both groups. 
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This suggests that, in addition to complexity effects leading to extreme investment behaviour, 
we also observe that negative experiences lead to reduced importance of group membership 
in making decisions to trust. 
  These findings do not support the Black Sheep Effect (BSE), as all three studies do 
not show ingroup favouritism, and no differences were observed between investments in 
untrustworthy ingroup and outgroup partners towards the end of the game. Moreover, the 
BSE indicates a moderating effect of identification with the ingroup (Marques et al., 1988), 
and effects of identification were limited in our studies.  
  In summary, this research shows that group-based biases influence how people update 
impressions and learn about individual trustworthiness. Interestingly, the influence of the 
group bias differs depending on the valence of the experiences. When interacting with 
trustworthy group members, people showed a tendency to trust outgroup members more over 
time. Depending on initial levels of bias, they also increased their trust more quickly. 
However, when group members did not reciprocate trust, initial biases disappeared over time 
and ingroup and outgroup members were treated similarly by the end of the game. Thus, we 
found that, within our student sample and using Western European national outgroups, people 
display a tendency to trust the outgroup more, but this tendency disappears when interacting 
with untrustworthy people.  
On the Initial Outgroup Bias 
  The outgroup bias that was demonstrated and replicated in Studies 1 and 2 was 
surprising, as the literature mostly suggests that people favour ingroup members over 
outgroup members in cooperative game settings (Balliet et al., 2014). We believe that the 
general outgroup bias observed here is mostly due to the samples of university students, as 
they are often more politically liberal (Bailey & Williams, 2016), including being more 
egalitarian in their views about groups and having greater sensitivity about what responses 
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are appropriate (Henry, 2008; Peterson, 2001). An online study conducted in 2016, with 
undergraduate students at the university where Studies 2 and 3 were conducted, demonstrated 
that students express very positive attitudes towards many outgroups, including Western 
European immigrants (see supplementary materials for description and results of the study). 
Thus, we suggest the possibility that this general outgroup bias would be most likely to occur 
in situations in which people have egalitarian attitudes or are motivated to view the outgroup 
positively (e.g. Moskowitz, Salomon, & Taylor, 2000; Shepherd, Spears, & Manstead, 2013). 
These situations are common, such as when a liberal-minded person meets a member of a 
novel ethnic group, when one is a tourist in a foreign country, or when a psychologist meets 
an economist at an interdisciplinary conference. 
Limitations and Future Directions  
         Nationality was chosen as group manipulation because it was our aim to use naturally 
occurring groups to increase the ecological validity of this research. We wanted to 
specifically explore learning when people already have some pre-existing knowledge or 
expectation about the outgroup, because that is often the case in the real world. Future 
research could examine several characteristics regarding the relation between ingroup and 
outgroup. First, it would be interesting to use more antagonistic groups to examine situations 
in which people have a clear motivation to favour the ingroup over the outgroup. Second, 
manipulating or measuring complexity representation of outgroups as well as group 
entitativity perceptions (i.e. the extent to which a group is considered as one entity instead of 
a collection of individual entities), would further the research. This variation in groups should 
show us whether these results would also hold towards antagonistic outgroups, due to the 
complexity of the group representation. Of course, situations in which there is not explicit 
ingroup bias, or even outgroup favourability, can and do occur (Cuddy et al., 2008; Jussim et 
al., 1987; Trifiletti & Capozza, 2011), and that is indeed what we found here.  
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  With regard to entitativity perceptions, we would argue that the change to a single 
nationality in Study 3 increases perceptions of entitativity, although this was not explicitly 
measured. We would predict that higher entitative groups lead to more generalisation 
between individual group members, and therefore to less steep learning curves about 
individual trustworthiness (Crawford, Sherman, & Hamilton, 2002). Finally, it would be very 
interesting to examine whether our findings might generalise to other types of groups as well, 
such as sport affiliation, university membership, or political orientation. The effect of the type 
of group used might relate to the factors described above, with different effects for more or 
less antagonistic, complex, and entitative groups. 
 
Conclusion 
         This research studied the influence of group biases on learning about trustworthiness. 
It was found, and replicated in two different European countries, that people demonstrate a 
positive bias towards outgroup members who reciprocated generous behaviour in an 
economic exchange. When integrating group membership information with individual 
experiences, the effect of group remains important throughout repeated interactions, but only 
with positive experiences. When individuals behave in an untrustworthy manner, group 
membership ceased to have an important effect on decisions to trust. This is the first research 
to examine how initial group-level biases interact with repeated encounters with different 
individuals in a laboratory environment. Our work has implications for real-world behaviour, 
such as when an outgroup member becomes a co-worker, neighbour, or part of a friendship 
group. It suggests that any favouritism earned by an outgroup member will be robust through 
future positive interactions. However, this favouritism can quickly turn when he or she 
behaves in a negative manner, which elicits behaviour similar to that induced by a negative 
ingroup member. 
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